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the vagueness arises in part from the very nature of political conditions in Holland; powers were everywhere ill-defined, and thus some officials usurped powers and others neglected duties, but this makes only the more necessary a distinct and careful description of the government. The life of the Prince of Orange is drawn with a firm hand, but the political background is confused and unsatisfactory.

The biography as a whole is a valuable contribution to the history of a country too little studied by American scholars.

It is unfortunate that a work so charmingly written should be disfigured by the constant use of the cleft infinitive, the invariable misplacement of the word "only," the occasional use of a singular subject with a plural verb, crude phrases such as "different—than," and a sentence like this: "The pistol was picked up and it was discovered that it had blown off Jaureguy's—such proved to be the name of the villain—thumb in the discharge" (II. 339). *Han* (I. 90, 91) is evidently a misprint for *Ham*. History has given the honorable title of "The Great Elector" to Frederick William of Brandenburg, not to Maurice of Saxony (II. 428). The genealogical tables (I. 7; II. 433) are crowded as regards form, and therefore leave much to be desired. The work has but two maps, and both are unsatisfactory; the map of the Netherlands (II. 20) is confused in coloring, while the map of the United Provinces fails to indicate what the seven provinces were. Other maps are needed, showing the location of Orange and the Nassau estates, as well as the territory affected by the various political unions formed. A copy of the famous painting of Miereveld in the royal museum at Amsterdam would have supplemented well the description of it given in the appendix, and would have been a valuable addition to the many admirable illustrations of the work.

LUCY M. SALMON.

*Gustavus Adolphus: A History of the Art of War from its Revival after the Middle Ages to the End of the Spanish Succession War, with a detailed Account of the most famous Campaigns of Turenne, Condé, Eugene, and Marlborough.* By THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel United States Army, retired list. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1895. Pp. xxiii, 864.)

EVERY one interested in the study of the art of war is beholden to Colonel Dodge for the work that he is doing in setting forth the origin and development of that art in the form of a series of volumes devoted to the lives and achievements of its greatest masters. His work has a value which the separate appreciation of its component volumes would hardly represent. It is the first attempt to produce a convenient means of studying the art of war in the manner recommended by Napoleon, that of reading and rereading the campaigns of the world's great captains. The author takes from among the heroes of military history six epoch-

making representatives, three of whom belong to antiquity and three to modern times: Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. Grouping about each one his principal contemporaries and such minor predecessors and successors as connect him with his dead and unborn peers, he devotes a separate volume to setting before the reader the several characters of each group in the light of the principal events of their careers.

Like the other volumes of the series, the one before us is dedicated to "The American Soldier," and must be regarded as addressed, and especially suited, to the military reader, by which is meant any one, be he soldier or civilian, who reads for military information. If the object of the reader is political information, he had better look for it in such works as Gindely's and Gardiner's *Thirty Years' War*, and the lives of Gustavus Adolphus by Leslie in English, by Parieu in French, and by Droysen in German. If it is romantic or blood-stirring sensation, he will find it in Schiller's brilliant but untrustworthy history of the Thirty Years' War. Colonel Dodge's book is a comprehensive history of the principal military changes and events which took place in Europe in consequence of the invention of printing, the introduction of gunpowder, and the Reformation. It comprises, beside the campaigns of the great Swede, and of his famous opponents Wallenstein and Tilly, those of Cromwell, Turenne, Condé, Marlborough, Prince Eugene, Charles XII., and other great generals. The author's analyses of characters and summing up of records will be read with special interest and will generally, we believe, be approved. In placing Prince Eugene above Marlborough he but confirms the judgment of the most competent critics. The reader will find in the campaigns of Gustavus the earliest military operations conducted from a regular base, and in the counter-offensive of Wallenstein, culminating in the battle of Lützen, the first grand attempt against an enemy's communications, one in which the offensive, operating as Hood did in Sherman's rear, independently of a base, compelled the opposing army to fall back and fight its own Nashville. In the campaigns of Turenne he will see the wary feints and thrusts characterizing the earliest contests in which both opponents had communications to guard; and then, if he will turn to the chapter on Charles XII., he may behold a descendant of Gustavus, the originator of methodical warfare, plunging with a feeble army into the heart of an enemy's country, in apparent ignorance or disregard of any such thing as a base or line of communication.

The success of every great soldier has been due more or less to his originating some method or implement of war, of which for a time he had a monopoly. This is pre-eminently the case with Gustavus Adolphus. Among the innovations which he is said to have originated or suggested are the paper cartridge, the cartridge-box, the bayonet, light artillery, fixed ammunition for artillery, or the artillery cartridge, the modern tactical unit, or the battalion, and the brigade. He laid the foundations of

modern military discipline, and was the first to provide an army with surgeons and chaplains. There is no other man whose name is associated with as many military improvements. Perhaps the one which is destined to endure the longest is that of the line of communication. Prior to his time armies had depots and magazines which might have been regarded as bases of operation, but in order to get supplies from them it was necessary to go to them, very much as a modern war vessel goes to a coaling station, or at the best to send to them. There was no regular system for forwarding supplies from them. Gustavus first showed the practicability of such a thing, and in so doing illustrated for the first time the importance of what is now known as Military Geography.

The author begins by briefly sketching the military history of the Middle Ages, and then describes the armament, organization, and tactics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Here the reader will perhaps be disappointed by the lack of information as to certain details, as to where Gustavus Adolphus devised or invented, and where he simply adopted and introduced, and as to the extent to which his innovations in the Swedish army were copied or anticipated in the armies with which he contended. The reader will learn that about 1626 he introduced the wheel-lock into his army, and may therefrom draw the erroneous conclusion that the wheel-lock was in general use in the Swedish army during the subsequent wars of Gustavus. He is left in the dark as to whether the Germans or Poles had wheel-locks, and is given no adequate idea of what a wheel-lock is or in what respects and to what extent it had the advantage over the match-lock. He is not told the range either of the small arms or of the artillery.

Most of the book is taken up with military operations. One cannot read them without being impressed with the author's familiarity with his subject and with the soundness of his military judgments and criticisms. But the average reader will find it hard to fix his mind upon them. He will lay the book down at frequent intervals, or read but a little at a time. Colonel Dodge has a style of writing which may be characterized as free and easy, and which, it need hardly be added, lacks the conciseness essential to good military narration. He is not careful to state the military problem and the means available for solving it, before taking up the solution of it, and to give an idea of the purpose or object of a movement as he describes it. He omits political details which are properly a part of the military history of the Thirty Years' War, and essential to the lessons to be learned from it.

Gustavus Adolphus entered Germany with a field army numbering about 13,000 men, at a time when the forces under Tilly and Wallenstein numbered about 100,000. He counted on re-enforcements, which soon came to him, from home and from friendly states, but like Alexander in Asia, and Hannibal in Europe, he relied largely for recruits upon the enemy's country. The main or general idea of his successive campaigns was to arouse the disaffected elements in the German Empire and attach them

to his cause. There were two feelings or passions for him to work upon, the religious and the political; and two means of working upon them, persuasion and force. Much, if not most, of the interest of the Thirty Years' War, and of its value as a military study, lies in the political operations conducted by and with these agencies. As an exposition of the state of the art of war, the book would be more instructive if fewer campaigns were discussed, and these gone into more deeply; especially, if more attention were paid to the arrangements on Gustavus' lines of communication, which, together with his political power, would seem to be the great secret of his invincibility. The battles are very well described, the numbers, dispositions, movements, and results being clearly, and perhaps without exception correctly, set forth. Colonel Dodge asserts that at the battle of Breitenfeld the Imperialists were drawn up in a single line. "Only the Italian author Gualdo," he says, "speaks of two lines; other accounts mention no second line." On page 52 of the *Précis des Campagnes de Gustave Adolphe en Allemagne* (Bibliothèque Internationale) we find the following statement: "Most of the plans of the battle of Breitenfeld represent the Imperialists in a single line; according to Colonel Stammfort, this error—which Lossan (*Ideale der Kriegsführung*) calls an absurdity—results from the fact that these plans were made by the Swedes, who could but imperfectly observe the positions of their adversaries during the action."

As one takes up this book for the first time, and observes the numerous maps scattered through it, and the large map at the end, one thinks, or ventures to hope, that it is one of those rare gems of military bibliography, a history that can be read without the aid of an atlas. But experience soon brings one to a different state of mind. The maps in the text are mostly patches of the large map at the end of the book, and on a smaller scale than the latter. If they were on a larger scale, or showed the positions of troops or lines of march, they would serve a useful purpose. As it is, they are worse than useless, for they distract the attention of the reader from the better map. The large map does not, when unfolded, come outside of the book. A part of it cannot be seen without turning back the leaves. The reader would do well to cut it out before undertaking to use it. Its general excellence is marred by a few errors and omissions. Freiberg is shown as Freiburg. The points Castellaun, Giessen, Frankenthal, Marbach, Langendenzlingen, referred to in the text, are not shown on it. The map on page 104 shows Naumburg as Naumberg. On page 371 Wittenberg is referred to as Wittenburg; and on page 365, Freiberg as Freiburg. The maps of battles and sieges give the positions of troops in a satisfactory manner, but do not in all cases show the scale. That the maps of campaigns do not indicate positions of troops or lines of march is especially to be regretted, as the author, in referring to particular points, many of which the reader will never have heard of, does not give the state or province in which they are located.

The body of the work numbers 850 pages, forming sixty-five chapters. The apprehension expressed by the author that the volume errs in being bulky will be a conviction in the mind of the reader. This fault might have been palliated in a measure by the subdivision of the work into parts. One of the divisions should in this case have fallen upon the death of Gustavus, who dies about the middle of the book. The reader will wish that the numbers of troops were given in figures instead of in words. At the end will be found a list of notable marches of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of battles in the same period, with percentages of losses, a list of dates, and an exhaustive index. This book contains a great deal of military information that cannot be found in any other single one, or perhaps in any number of books short of a fair-sized library. It is a valuable work of reference on the revival of the art of war after the Middle Ages, and as such is heartily commended to all who are interested in that subject.

JOHN BIGELOW, JR.

*Louis XIV. and the Zenith of the French Monarchy.* By ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A., Student of Christ Church, Oxford. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1895 Pp. xvi, 444.)

MR. HASSALL is right in claiming for Louis XIV. a place among national heroes. Notwithstanding his mediocre intellect, and his overweening vanity, the narrowness of his religious beliefs and the errors of his policy, the monarch who played so great a part in his day has taken his place among the famous men of history. With all his weaknesses, there was in Louis XIV. much that can rightly be called great; of no man could it be more truly said that he was every inch a king; to the duties of his great office he devoted a conscientious and life-long attention; if he enjoyed the pomp of place he did not shirk the responsibilities; there was a dignity to his character of which his dignity of manner was the fitting expression; tenacious of his own position, he was mindful of the rights of inferiors; amidst a bustling world he bore himself with a certain empyrean calm; he met adversity with fortitude; he exerted a great and permanent influence on the age in which he lived and the people over whom he ruled.

Of the long reign which filled three-quarters of a century, Mr. Hassall has given an eminently fair and just review. There is little new to be said of the events of that period, but it is easy to fall into excessive laudation of the king, and still more easy to belittle his character. Louis XIV. has suffered alike from undeserved flattery and from indiscriminate abuse. If historians of his own day constantly proclaimed him the greatest of kings and of men, modern writers have gone as far wrong in announcing that the great monarch was in reality only an exceptionally ignorant and stupid man, governed in turn by an unscrupulous minister, a designing priest, and a bigoted old woman. Mr. Hassall has avoided these extremes and has given a just estimate of an extraordinary character.